

The background features a dark blue grid with binary code (0s and 1s) scattered across it. In the center, there is a circular graphic resembling a data visualization or a stylized globe, with lines radiating from its center and a ring of data points around its perimeter.

# STATE OF CYBERSECURITY IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY

Tripwire Energy Working Group – August 10 2021

# INTRODUCTION

- Former utility staff (telecommunications, water & electric)
- First NERC CIP auditor in the US
- Drafter of NERC CIP standards and formal interpretations
- NERC CIP Supply Chain Working Group contributor
- Former Principal Investigator US DOE National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization
- EnergySec Founder, Director and President Emeritus
- Centro de Ciberseguridad Industrial (CCI) US Coordinator
- Cybersecurity Advisory Team for State Solar, NARUC/NASEO
- Advisor to multiple industrial security product vendors
- GCIP, CISA, CRISC, CISSP-ISSAP, SSCP, NSA-IAM, CVI, TCP, SCP

# GLOBAL SITUATION

- Infrastructure is a **target**
- Your adversaries have three things **you don't**
- Who are you **up against?**
  - Organized crime
  - Nation states
  - Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
  - Competitors
  - Ourselves (Hanlon's Razor)
- We all buy our gear from the **same sources**
- Attribution is **getting** better
- Cyber warfare, espionage and prosecution **norms**

# CRYSTAL BALL

- Each “catalytic event” creates a cyber-avalanche
- NERC CIP moved the needle for electric sector, **everyone noticed**
- Legislators, regulators and commissions are getting wiser
  - **18 new cybersecurity bills** introduced in just this session
- Regulation to the **rescue!**
- Real world examples:
  - Global trend (NIS, CAF, BSI, 62443, NIST 800-53/82/CSF, NERC CIP)
  - FERC RFI seeking to align with NIST
  - 100-day Plan to Address Cybersecurity Risks
  - ES-C2M2 (new version) & ONG C2-M2 being used by commissions and underwriters
  - TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines updated, Security Directives (x2); API 1164
  - DHS CISA ICS attack history
  - Recent updates to CFATS
  - Too many Executive Orders to list
  - New National Security Memorandum

# NATIONAL SECURITY MEMORANDUM

- Not a law/regulation – **voluntary collaborative initiative** (for now)
- Baseline security controls **across all critical infra sectors**
- Some controls will be **common** with existing frameworks (CIP)
- NIST **800-53/82** are being promoted (expected) to be the set
- Measurement (**no enforcement**) will be DHS CISA and SSA
- Unclear how measurement will happen (**audit, assessment?**)
- Will apply **first to electricity subsector**, then gas, chemical, water
  - Unclear if “National Security” banner will loop in **Distribution**
- Final framework to be completed by **July 28, 2022**
- Clear signaling that participation is expected, **or else...**

# NSM – WHAT DO I NEED TO DO?

- “...**deployment of technologies** and systems that provide threat [and anomaly] visibility, indications, detection, and warnings...”
- “...**response capabilities** for cybersecurity in essential control system and operational technology networks...”
- “...” **Government and industry to collaborate** to take immediate action...”
- “...**baseline cybersecurity goals** that are consistent across all critical infrastructure sectors...”

# NSM – RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

- Gap **assessment** of current CIP controls against 800-53/82
  - CIP has already been mapped, use existing tools
- Create action plan to **remediate** any control gaps
  - Owners, actions, dates, budget
- Begin any architecture/system **modifications** needed for increased monitoring, detection, response and recovery
- Procure and/or tune **network anomaly detection** software
  - CRISP, Neighborhood Keeper, Essence or other
- Establish trained and resourced **security operations** function
  - Can be outsourced or insourced
  - Process, analyze, respond and tune new tools
- Perform **REAL** incident and recovery response exercises

# NSA – VOLUNTARY VS. MANDATORY

- PR incentives/hit – public **perception minimum** bar has been set
- Cyber **insurance** impacts can be very real
- Business **partnerships** – upstream/downstream; M&A, contracts
- Constrained **markets** over time
- Earlier adopter **bonus points** with oversight body
- Easier to demonstrate proactive **continuous improvement** vs. late-stage, time-constrained, forced, and reactive efforts
- Given the situational gravity, it **may be inevitable**
- If not the NSM, then any one of the **other “influences”**



# DIRECT SIGNALING

*"...defend US critical infrastructure by encouraging & facilitating deployment of tech & systems that provide threat visibility, indications, detection, & warnings, & that facilitate response capabilities for cybersecurity in essential control system & operational tech networks."*

*"We're committed to addressing it. We're **starting with voluntary**, as much as we can, because we want to do this in full partnership. And — but we're **also pursuing all options we have in order to make the rapid progress we need.**"*

*"...multiple administrations have recognized that there are no mandated authorities to mandate cybersecurity requirements for critical infrastructure... in the context of our openly saying that we really are **committed to addressing the limited and piecemeal regulation...**"*

*"The President is essentially saying, **'We expect responsible owners and operators to meet these performance goals. We will look to you to implement this.'**"*

- National Security Memorandum on Improving Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure Control Systems, The White House  
June 28, 2021

# COMMON SOLUTION THREADS

- For organizations already subject to NERC CIP, much can be **borrowed**
- Other **controls frameworks** also exist for an “overlay” (mapping) approach to managing compliance risk
- **Portable skill sets** across sector types in OT
  - IT already has common skill pool
- Some **Common solutions** exist for IT and OT
  - Hardware
  - Software

# “REGULATORY” FORECAST

- Whether direct regulation (CIP, TSA, AWWA, CFATS) or indirect “transitive” regulation (NIST, EO, NSM), **new normal** is:
  - Buy only “trusted” hardware, software, services
  - Know all cyber assets in your environment
  - Know the security posture for all cyber assets
  - Segment and restrict access (zero trust, MFA)
  - Monitoring and detection at asset and network level
  - Strong incident response capability
  - Strong recovery capability
- Less “**guessing**” - aligns with guidelines, regulation, Executive Orders, National Security Memos, etc. in peer sectors
- Get ahead of this **before it is mandated**

# ASSETS AND ARCHITECTURE

- Do you have an **asset inventory**?
  - Not everything, but even just the critical stuff
  - Back it with change control or expect drift (waste time/money)
- Do you have an environment **you can defend**?
  - Segmented networks
  - One-way traffic
  - MFA and strict remote access controls
  - Shear-away networks, “crumple zones,” intelligent islanding
- **Interdependencies** can be your Achilles heel
  - Runs converse to many current approaches

# IN THE LAND OF THE BLIND

- Would you know – **with sufficient confidence** – if there was (or was not) an adversary in your system?
- **Monitoring** is in every federal conversation now
  - CRISP, Neighborhood Keeper, Essense...
- “Smoke detectors” will be **required** in the “building code”
- Regulation, insurance, diligence, **reporting** (data breach)
- Start where you can, tune, then **lather, rinse, repeat**
- Based on solid asset inventory and feeds response and/or recovery

# SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT

- NERC CIP-013 is the **tip of the iceberg**
  - Adding new asset types and moving to low impact
- Multiple Executive Orders, probably **more to come**
- "No-buy" lists, rip/replace, **legacy risk** often unaddressed
- "Made in" often means **"assembled in"**
- How far do you go? Was it **far enough?**
- HBOM, **SBOM**, FBOM
- CyberStar, transparency centers, certification, validation
- Frustration and costs **go up for everyone**

# PRACTICE LIKE IT'S GAME DAY

- When was the last time you did a **real** incident response exercise?
  - Did it include a recovery drill?
  - Did it include IT impacting OT through business process?
- Everything else **leads up to this**
  - Asset inventory, supply chain, segmentation, monitoring
- Borrow from operations (and safety)
  - **Can you really go to manual?** For how long?
- Expect **“oversight”** and media when it happens
  - Cyber NTSB, CISA, E-ISAC, FBI, Commerce, State...
- What happens to one utility **will affect all others...**

# NERC CIP HORIZON

- Legislators, regulators and agencies are **getting wiser**
- **Drifting** toward NIST (FERC RFI)
- Focus on CIP-007, CIP-008 and CIP-009
  - Monitoring, incident response, and recovery
- Supply Chain
  - Coming to a **Low Impact** asset near you
- Cloud (BCSI and **BCS**)
- Virtualization
  - **Biggest shift** in CIP since v3 to v5
- **Global** adoption is picking up steam



# NON-REGULATORY FORECAST

- Innovation is accelerating **disruption and disruption**
- OT looking more like IT, getting closer to **just T**
- Smart everything will be **connected** to smart everything
- Ever increasing **dependence** on technology and data
- Losing touch with **manual** options
- Artificially intelligent systems **can still be hacked**
- **Competing forces** of unregulated greenfield business in distribution vs. threat of regulation for distribution

# DATA WILL ALSO BE YOUR BUSINESS

- Digital transformation, convergence & other **buzzwords**
- **Data** is the new oil ...and also the new toxic waste
- Everything you buy is **digital** now, with a **connection**
- What happens when **everything** in your operation generates a data (revenue) stream?
- Someone else can do it **faster and better** than you
- You may possibly make more **revenue** from operational data than the electrons used to create the data

# EMBRACING THE FUTURE

- More **regulation is coming** – must be “this tall” to ride
  - Will likely go beyond NERC CIP, but not by much
  - Wider possible applicability
- Regulations and standards will **shift** with threats and tech
  - For example, ransomware...
- Control norms are **emerging** for both OT and IT, globally
- Technology is **transforming** how we can do business
  - Data as a revenue stream will become more common
- Regulation is **changing** to allow new virtualized and cloud models for data, applications and even infrastructure
  - GoToMySCADA/HMI/DCS/EMS/PLC/DigitalTwin is a thing

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